Last commit july 5th

spa/node_modules/sigstore/dist/tlog/verify/body.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import type { Bundle, TransparencyLogEntry } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+export declare function verifyTLogBody(entry: TransparencyLogEntry, bundleContent: Bundle['content']): boolean;

spa/node_modules/sigstore/dist/tlog/verify/body.js

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyTLogBody = void 0;
+/*
+Copyright 2023 The Sigstore Authors.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+const error_1 = require("../../error");
+const util_1 = require("../../util");
+const TLOG_MISMATCH_ERROR_MSG = 'bundle content and tlog entry do not match';
+// Compare the given tlog entry to the given bundle
+function verifyTLogBody(entry, bundleContent) {
+    const { kind, version } = entry.kindVersion;
+    const body = JSON.parse(entry.canonicalizedBody.toString('utf8'));
+    try {
+        if (kind !== body.kind || version !== body.apiVersion) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError(TLOG_MISMATCH_ERROR_MSG);
+        }
+        switch (body.kind) {
+            case 'dsse':
+                verifyDSSETLogBody(body, bundleContent);
+                break;
+            case 'intoto':
+                verifyIntotoTLogBody(body, bundleContent);
+                break;
+            case 'hashedrekord':
+                verifyHashedRekordTLogBody(body, bundleContent);
+                break;
+            default:
+                throw new error_1.VerificationError(`unsupported kind in tlog entry: ${kind}`);
+        }
+        return true;
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+exports.verifyTLogBody = verifyTLogBody;
+// Compare the given intoto tlog entry to the given bundle
+function verifyDSSETLogBody(tlogEntry, content) {
+    if (content?.$case !== 'dsseEnvelope') {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(`unsupported bundle content: ${content?.$case || 'unknown'}`);
+    }
+    const dsse = content.dsseEnvelope;
+    switch (tlogEntry.apiVersion) {
+        case '0.0.1':
+            verifyDSSE001TLogBody(tlogEntry, dsse);
+            break;
+        default:
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError(`unsupported dsse version: ${tlogEntry.apiVersion}`);
+    }
+}
+// Compare the given intoto tlog entry to the given bundle
+function verifyIntotoTLogBody(tlogEntry, content) {
+    if (content?.$case !== 'dsseEnvelope') {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(`unsupported bundle content: ${content?.$case || 'unknown'}`);
+    }
+    const dsse = content.dsseEnvelope;
+    switch (tlogEntry.apiVersion) {
+        case '0.0.2':
+            verifyIntoto002TLogBody(tlogEntry, dsse);
+            break;
+        default:
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError(`unsupported intoto version: ${tlogEntry.apiVersion}`);
+    }
+}
+// Compare the given hashedrekord tlog entry to the given bundle
+function verifyHashedRekordTLogBody(tlogEntry, content) {
+    if (content?.$case !== 'messageSignature') {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(`unsupported bundle content: ${content?.$case || 'unknown'}`);
+    }
+    const messageSignature = content.messageSignature;
+    switch (tlogEntry.apiVersion) {
+        case '0.0.1':
+            verifyHashedrekor001TLogBody(tlogEntry, messageSignature);
+            break;
+        default:
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError(`unsupported hashedrekord version: ${tlogEntry.apiVersion}`);
+    }
+}
+// Compare the given dsse v0.0.1 tlog entry to the given DSSE envelope.
+function verifyDSSE001TLogBody(tlogEntry, dsse) {
+    // Collect all of the signatures from the DSSE envelope
+    // Turns them into base64-encoded strings for comparison
+    const dsseSigs = dsse.signatures.map((signature) => signature.sig.toString('base64'));
+    // Collect all of the signatures from the tlog entry
+    const tlogSigs = tlogEntry.spec.signatures?.map((signature) => signature.signature);
+    // Ensure the bundle's DSSE and the tlog entry contain the same number of signatures
+    if (dsseSigs.length !== tlogSigs?.length) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(TLOG_MISMATCH_ERROR_MSG);
+    }
+    // Ensure that every signature in the bundle's DSSE is present in the tlog entry
+    if (!dsseSigs.every((dsseSig) => tlogSigs.includes(dsseSig))) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(TLOG_MISMATCH_ERROR_MSG);
+    }
+    // Ensure the digest of the bundle's DSSE payload matches the digest in the
+    // tlog entry
+    const dssePayloadHash = util_1.crypto.hash(dsse.payload).toString('hex');
+    if (dssePayloadHash !== tlogEntry.spec.payloadHash?.value) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(TLOG_MISMATCH_ERROR_MSG);
+    }
+}
+// Compare the given intoto v0.0.2 tlog entry to the given DSSE envelope.
+function verifyIntoto002TLogBody(tlogEntry, dsse) {
+    // Collect all of the signatures from the DSSE envelope
+    // Turns them into base64-encoded strings for comparison
+    const dsseSigs = dsse.signatures.map((signature) => signature.sig.toString('base64'));
+    // Collect all of the signatures from the tlog entry
+    // Remember that tlog signastures are double base64-encoded
+    const tlogSigs = tlogEntry.spec.content.envelope?.signatures.map((signature) => (signature.sig ? util_1.encoding.base64Decode(signature.sig) : ''));
+    // Ensure the bundle's DSSE and the tlog entry contain the same number of signatures
+    if (dsseSigs.length !== tlogSigs?.length) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(TLOG_MISMATCH_ERROR_MSG);
+    }
+    // Ensure that every signature in the bundle's DSSE is present in the tlog entry
+    if (!dsseSigs.every((dsseSig) => tlogSigs.includes(dsseSig))) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(TLOG_MISMATCH_ERROR_MSG);
+    }
+    // Ensure the digest of the bundle's DSSE payload matches the digest in the
+    // tlog entry
+    const dssePayloadHash = util_1.crypto.hash(dsse.payload).toString('hex');
+    if (dssePayloadHash !== tlogEntry.spec.content.payloadHash?.value) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(TLOG_MISMATCH_ERROR_MSG);
+    }
+}
+// Compare the given hashedrekord v0.0.1 tlog entry to the given message
+// signature
+function verifyHashedrekor001TLogBody(tlogEntry, messageSignature) {
+    // Ensure that the bundles message signature matches the tlog entry
+    const msgSig = messageSignature.signature.toString('base64');
+    const tlogSig = tlogEntry.spec.signature.content;
+    if (msgSig !== tlogSig) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(TLOG_MISMATCH_ERROR_MSG);
+    }
+    // Ensure that the bundle's message digest matches the tlog entry
+    const msgDigest = messageSignature.messageDigest?.digest.toString('hex');
+    const tlogDigest = tlogEntry.spec.data.hash?.value;
+    if (msgDigest !== tlogDigest) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError(TLOG_MISMATCH_ERROR_MSG);
+    }
+}

spa/node_modules/sigstore/dist/tlog/verify/checkpoint.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+import type { TLogEntryWithInclusionProof } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+import * as sigstore from '../../types/sigstore';
+export declare function verifyCheckpoint(entry: TLogEntryWithInclusionProof, tlogs: sigstore.TransparencyLogInstance[]): boolean;

spa/node_modules/sigstore/dist/tlog/verify/checkpoint.js

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyCheckpoint = void 0;
+const error_1 = require("../../error");
+const util_1 = require("../../util");
+// Separator between the note and the signatures in a checkpoint
+const CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR = '\n\n';
+// Checkpoint signatures are of the following form:
+// "– <identity> <key_hint+signature_bytes>\n"
+// where:
+// - the prefix is an emdash (U+2014).
+// - <identity> gives a human-readable representation of the signing ID.
+// - <key_hint+signature_bytes> is the first 4 bytes of the SHA256 hash of the
+//   associated public key followed by the signature bytes.
+const SIGNATURE_REGEX = /\u2014 (\S+) (\S+)\n/g;
+// Verifies the checkpoint value in the given tlog entry. There are two steps
+// to the verification:
+// 1. Verify that all signatures in the checkpoint can be verified against a
+//    trusted public key
+// 2. Verify that the root hash in the checkpoint matches the root hash in the
+//    inclusion proof
+// See: https://github.com/transparency-dev/formats/blob/main/log/README.md
+function verifyCheckpoint(entry, tlogs) {
+    // Filter tlog instances to just those which were valid at the time of the
+    // entry
+    const validTLogs = filterTLogInstances(tlogs, entry.integratedTime);
+    const inclusionProof = entry.inclusionProof;
+    const signedNote = SignedNote.fromString(inclusionProof.checkpoint.envelope);
+    const checkpoint = LogCheckpoint.fromString(signedNote.note);
+    // Verify that the signatures in the checkpoint are all valid, also check
+    // that the root hash from the checkpoint matches the root hash in the
+    // inclusion proof
+    return (signedNote.verify(validTLogs) &&
+        util_1.crypto.bufferEqual(checkpoint.logHash, inclusionProof.rootHash));
+}
+exports.verifyCheckpoint = verifyCheckpoint;
+// SignedNote represents a signed note from a transparency log checkpoint. Consists
+// of a body (or note) and one more signatures calculated over the body. See
+// https://github.com/transparency-dev/formats/blob/main/log/README.md#signed-envelope
+class SignedNote {
+    constructor(note, signatures) {
+        this.note = note;
+        this.signatures = signatures;
+    }
+    // Deserialize a SignedNote from a string
+    static fromString(envelope) {
+        if (!envelope.includes(CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR)) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError('malformed checkpoint: no separator');
+        }
+        // Split the note into the header and the data portions at the separator
+        const split = envelope.indexOf(CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR);
+        const header = envelope.slice(0, split + 1);
+        const data = envelope.slice(split + CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR.length);
+        // Find all the signature lines in the data portion
+        const matches = data.matchAll(SIGNATURE_REGEX);
+        // Parse each of the matched signature lines into the name and signature.
+        // The first four bytes of the signature are the key hint (should match the
+        // first four bytes of the log ID), and the rest is the signature itself.
+        const signatures = Array.from(matches, (match) => {
+            const [, name, signature] = match;
+            const sigBytes = Buffer.from(signature, 'base64');
+            if (sigBytes.length < 5) {
+                throw new error_1.VerificationError('malformed checkpoint: invalid signature');
+            }
+            return {
+                name,
+                keyHint: sigBytes.subarray(0, 4),
+                signature: sigBytes.subarray(4),
+            };
+        });
+        if (signatures.length === 0) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError('malformed checkpoint: no signatures');
+        }
+        return new SignedNote(header, signatures);
+    }
+    // Verifies the signatures in the SignedNote. For each signature, the
+    // corresponding transparency log is looked up by the key hint and the
+    // signature is verified against the public key in the transparency log.
+    // Throws an error if any of the signatures are invalid.
+    verify(tlogs) {
+        const data = Buffer.from(this.note, 'utf-8');
+        return this.signatures.every((signature) => {
+            // Find the transparency log instance with the matching key hint
+            const tlog = tlogs.find((tlog) => util_1.crypto.bufferEqual(tlog.logId.keyId.subarray(0, 4), signature.keyHint));
+            if (!tlog) {
+                return false;
+            }
+            const publicKey = util_1.crypto.createPublicKey(tlog.publicKey.rawBytes);
+            return util_1.crypto.verifyBlob(data, publicKey, signature.signature);
+        });
+    }
+}
+// LogCheckpoint represents a transparency log checkpoint. Consists of the
+// following:
+//  - origin: the name of the transparency log
+//  - logSize: the size of the log at the time of the checkpoint
+//  - logHash: the root hash of the log at the time of the checkpoint
+//  - rest: the rest of the checkpoint body, which is a list of log entries
+// See:
+// https://github.com/transparency-dev/formats/blob/main/log/README.md#checkpoint-body
+class LogCheckpoint {
+    constructor(origin, logSize, logHash, rest) {
+        this.origin = origin;
+        this.logSize = logSize;
+        this.logHash = logHash;
+        this.rest = rest;
+    }
+    static fromString(note) {
+        const lines = note.trim().split('\n');
+        if (lines.length < 4) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError('malformed checkpoint: too few lines in header');
+        }
+        const origin = lines[0];
+        const logSize = BigInt(lines[1]);
+        const rootHash = Buffer.from(lines[2], 'base64');
+        const rest = lines.slice(3);
+        return new LogCheckpoint(origin, logSize, rootHash, rest);
+    }
+}
+// Filter the list of tlog instances to only those which have usable public
+// keys and were valid at the given time.
+function filterTLogInstances(tlogInstances, integratedTime) {
+    const targetDate = new Date(Number(integratedTime) * 1000);
+    return tlogInstances.filter((tlog) => {
+        // Must have a log ID
+        if (!tlog.logId) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // If the tlog doesn't have a public key, we can't use it
+        const publicKey = tlog.publicKey;
+        if (publicKey === undefined) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // If the tlog doesn't have a rawBytes field, we can't use it
+        if (publicKey.rawBytes === undefined) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // If the tlog doesn't have a validFor field, we don't need to check it
+        const validFor = publicKey.validFor;
+        if (validFor === undefined) {
+            return true;
+        }
+        // Check that the integrated time is within the validFor range
+        return (validFor.start !== undefined &&
+            validFor.start <= targetDate &&
+            (validFor.end === undefined || targetDate <= validFor.end));
+    });
+}

spa/node_modules/sigstore/dist/tlog/verify/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+import { Bundle } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+import * as sigstore from '../../types/sigstore';
+export declare function verifyTLogEntries(bundle: Bundle, trustedRoot: sigstore.TrustedRoot, options: sigstore.ArtifactVerificationOptions_TlogOptions): void;

spa/node_modules/sigstore/dist/tlog/verify/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyTLogEntries = void 0;
+/*
+Copyright 2023 The Sigstore Authors.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+const bundle_1 = require("@sigstore/bundle");
+const error_1 = require("../../error");
+const cert_1 = require("../../x509/cert");
+const body_1 = require("./body");
+const checkpoint_1 = require("./checkpoint");
+const merkle_1 = require("./merkle");
+const set_1 = require("./set");
+// Verifies that the number of tlog entries that pass offline verification
+// is greater than or equal to the threshold specified in the options.
+function verifyTLogEntries(bundle, trustedRoot, options) {
+    if (bundle.mediaType === bundle_1.BUNDLE_V01_MEDIA_TYPE) {
+        (0, bundle_1.assertBundleV01)(bundle);
+        verifyTLogEntriesForBundleV01(bundle, trustedRoot, options);
+    }
+    else {
+        (0, bundle_1.assertBundleLatest)(bundle);
+        verifyTLogEntriesForBundleLatest(bundle, trustedRoot, options);
+    }
+}
+exports.verifyTLogEntries = verifyTLogEntries;
+function verifyTLogEntriesForBundleV01(bundle, trustedRoot, options) {
+    if (options.performOnlineVerification) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError('Online verification not implemented');
+    }
+    // Extract the signing cert, if available
+    const signingCert = signingCertificate(bundle);
+    // Iterate over the tlog entries and verify each one
+    const verifiedEntries = bundle.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries.filter((entry) => verifyTLogEntryWithInclusionPromise(entry, bundle.content, trustedRoot.tlogs, signingCert));
+    if (verifiedEntries.length < options.threshold) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError('tlog verification failed');
+    }
+}
+function verifyTLogEntriesForBundleLatest(bundle, trustedRoot, options) {
+    if (options.performOnlineVerification) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError('Online verification not implemented');
+    }
+    // Extract the signing cert, if available
+    const signingCert = signingCertificate(bundle);
+    // Iterate over the tlog entries and verify each one
+    const verifiedEntries = bundle.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries.filter((entry) => verifyTLogEntryWithInclusionProof(entry, bundle.content, trustedRoot.tlogs, signingCert));
+    if (verifiedEntries.length < options.threshold) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError('tlog verification failed');
+    }
+}
+function verifyTLogEntryWithInclusionPromise(entry, bundleContent, tlogs, signingCert) {
+    // If there is a signing certificate availble, check that the tlog integrated
+    // time is within the certificate's validity period; otherwise, skip this
+    // check.
+    const verifyTLogIntegrationTime = signingCert
+        ? () => signingCert.validForDate(new Date(Number(entry.integratedTime) * 1000))
+        : () => true;
+    return ((0, body_1.verifyTLogBody)(entry, bundleContent) &&
+        (0, set_1.verifyTLogSET)(entry, tlogs) &&
+        verifyTLogIntegrationTime());
+}
+function verifyTLogEntryWithInclusionProof(entry, bundleContent, tlogs, signingCert) {
+    // If there is a signing certificate availble, check that the tlog integrated
+    // time is within the certificate's validity period; otherwise, skip this
+    // check.
+    const verifyTLogIntegrationTime = signingCert
+        ? () => signingCert.validForDate(new Date(Number(entry.integratedTime) * 1000))
+        : () => true;
+    return ((0, body_1.verifyTLogBody)(entry, bundleContent) &&
+        (0, merkle_1.verifyMerkleInclusion)(entry) &&
+        (0, checkpoint_1.verifyCheckpoint)(entry, tlogs) &&
+        verifyTLogIntegrationTime());
+}
+function signingCertificate(bundle) {
+    if (!(0, bundle_1.isBundleWithCertificateChain)(bundle)) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    const signingCert = bundle.verificationMaterial.content.x509CertificateChain.certificates[0];
+    return cert_1.x509Certificate.parse(signingCert.rawBytes);
+}

spa/node_modules/sigstore/dist/tlog/verify/merkle.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import type { TLogEntryWithInclusionProof } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+export declare function verifyMerkleInclusion(entry: TLogEntryWithInclusionProof): boolean;

spa/node_modules/sigstore/dist/tlog/verify/merkle.js

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+"use strict";
+var __importDefault = (this && this.__importDefault) || function (mod) {
+    return (mod && mod.__esModule) ? mod : { "default": mod };
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyMerkleInclusion = void 0;
+/*
+Copyright 2023 The Sigstore Authors.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+const crypto_1 = __importDefault(require("crypto"));
+const error_1 = require("../../error");
+const RFC6962_LEAF_HASH_PREFIX = Buffer.from([0x00]);
+const RFC6962_NODE_HASH_PREFIX = Buffer.from([0x01]);
+function verifyMerkleInclusion(entry) {
+    const inclusionProof = entry.inclusionProof;
+    const logIndex = BigInt(inclusionProof.logIndex);
+    const treeSize = BigInt(inclusionProof.treeSize);
+    if (logIndex < 0n || logIndex >= treeSize) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError('invalid inclusion proof index');
+    }
+    // Figure out which subset of hashes corresponds to the inner and border
+    // nodes
+    const { inner, border } = decompInclProof(logIndex, treeSize);
+    if (inclusionProof.hashes.length !== inner + border) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError('invalid inclusion proof length');
+    }
+    const innerHashes = inclusionProof.hashes.slice(0, inner);
+    const borderHashes = inclusionProof.hashes.slice(inner);
+    // The entry's hash is the leaf hash
+    const leafHash = hashLeaf(entry.canonicalizedBody);
+    // Chain the hashes belonging to the inner and border portions
+    const calculatedHash = chainBorderRight(chainInner(leafHash, innerHashes, logIndex), borderHashes);
+    // Calculated hash should match the root hash in the inclusion proof
+    return bufferEqual(calculatedHash, inclusionProof.rootHash);
+}
+exports.verifyMerkleInclusion = verifyMerkleInclusion;
+// Breaks down inclusion proof for a leaf at the specified index in a tree of
+// the specified size. The split point is where paths to the index leaf and
+// the (size - 1) leaf diverge. Returns lengths of the bottom and upper proof
+// parts.
+function decompInclProof(index, size) {
+    const inner = innerProofSize(index, size);
+    const border = onesCount(index >> BigInt(inner));
+    return { inner, border };
+}
+// Computes a subtree hash for a node on or below the tree's right border.
+// Assumes the provided proof hashes are ordered from lower to higher levels
+// and seed is the initial hash of the node specified by the index.
+function chainInner(seed, hashes, index) {
+    return hashes.reduce((acc, h, i) => {
+        if ((index >> BigInt(i)) & BigInt(1)) {
+            return hashChildren(h, acc);
+        }
+        else {
+            return hashChildren(acc, h);
+        }
+    }, seed);
+}
+// Computes a subtree hash for nodes along the tree's right border.
+function chainBorderRight(seed, hashes) {
+    return hashes.reduce((acc, h) => hashChildren(h, acc), seed);
+}
+function innerProofSize(index, size) {
+    return bitLength(index ^ (size - BigInt(1)));
+}
+// Counts the number of ones in the binary representation of the given number.
+// https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamming_weight
+function onesCount(x) {
+    return x.toString(2).split('1').length - 1;
+}
+// Returns the number of bits necessary to represent an integer in binary.
+function bitLength(n) {
+    if (n === 0n) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return n.toString(2).length;
+}
+// Hashing logic according to RFC6962.
+// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6962#section-2
+function hashChildren(left, right) {
+    const hasher = crypto_1.default.createHash('sha256');
+    hasher.update(RFC6962_NODE_HASH_PREFIX);
+    hasher.update(left);
+    hasher.update(right);
+    return hasher.digest();
+}
+function hashLeaf(leaf) {
+    const hasher = crypto_1.default.createHash('sha256');
+    hasher.update(RFC6962_LEAF_HASH_PREFIX);
+    hasher.update(leaf);
+    return hasher.digest();
+}
+function bufferEqual(a, b) {
+    try {
+        return crypto_1.default.timingSafeEqual(a, b);
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* istanbul ignore next */
+        return false;
+    }
+}

spa/node_modules/sigstore/dist/tlog/verify/set.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+import * as sigstore from '../../types/sigstore';
+import type { TLogEntryWithInclusionPromise } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+export declare function verifyTLogSET(entry: TLogEntryWithInclusionPromise, tlogs: sigstore.TransparencyLogInstance[]): boolean;

spa/node_modules/sigstore/dist/tlog/verify/set.js

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyTLogSET = void 0;
+const util_1 = require("../../util");
+// Verifies the SET for the given entry against the list of trusted
+// transparency logs. Returns true if the SET can be verified against at least
+// one of the trusted logs; otherwise, returns false.
+function verifyTLogSET(entry, tlogs) {
+    // Filter the list of tlog instances to only those which might be able to
+    // verify the SET
+    const validTLogs = filterTLogInstances(tlogs, entry.logId.keyId, entry.integratedTime);
+    // Check to see if we can verify the SET against any of the valid tlogs
+    return validTLogs.some((tlog) => {
+        const publicKey = util_1.crypto.createPublicKey(tlog.publicKey.rawBytes);
+        // Re-create the original Rekor verification payload
+        const payload = toVerificationPayload(entry);
+        // Canonicalize the payload and turn into a buffer for verification
+        const data = Buffer.from(util_1.json.canonicalize(payload), 'utf8');
+        // Extract the SET from the tlog entry
+        const signature = entry.inclusionPromise.signedEntryTimestamp;
+        return util_1.crypto.verifyBlob(data, publicKey, signature);
+    });
+}
+exports.verifyTLogSET = verifyTLogSET;
+// Returns a properly formatted "VerificationPayload" for one of the
+// transaction log entires in the given bundle which can be used for SET
+// verification.
+function toVerificationPayload(entry) {
+    const { integratedTime, logIndex, logId, canonicalizedBody } = entry;
+    return {
+        body: canonicalizedBody.toString('base64'),
+        integratedTime: Number(integratedTime),
+        logIndex: Number(logIndex),
+        logID: logId.keyId.toString('hex'),
+    };
+}
+// Filter the list of tlog instances to only those which match the given log
+// ID and have public keys which are valid for the given integrated time.
+function filterTLogInstances(tlogInstances, logID, integratedTime) {
+    const targetDate = new Date(Number(integratedTime) * 1000);
+    return tlogInstances.filter((tlog) => {
+        // If the log IDs don't match, we can't use this tlog
+        if (!tlog.logId?.keyId.equals(logID)) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // If the tlog doesn't have a public key, we can't use it
+        const publicKey = tlog.publicKey;
+        if (publicKey === undefined) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // If the tlog doesn't have a rawBytes field, we can't use it
+        if (publicKey.rawBytes === undefined) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // If the tlog doesn't have a validFor field, we don't need to check it
+        if (publicKey.validFor === undefined) {
+            return true;
+        }
+        // Check that the integrated time is within the validFor range
+        return (publicKey.validFor.start !== undefined &&
+            publicKey.validFor.start <= targetDate &&
+            (!publicKey.validFor.end || targetDate <= publicKey.validFor.end));
+    });
+}